Network Non-Neutrality on the Internet: Content Provision Under a
  Subscription Revenue Model by Lotfi, Mohammad Hassan et al.
Network Non-Neutrality on the Internet: Content Provision
Under a Subscription Revenue Model
Mohammad Hassan Lotfi
ESE Department
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA, 19104
lotfm@seas.upenn.edu
George Kesidis
EE and CS& E Department
Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA, 16803
kesidis@engr.psu.edu
Saswati Sarkar
ESE Department
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA, 19104
swati@seas.upenn.edu
ABSTRACT
The goal of this paper is to provide an insight into the equi-
librium of the Internet market, when the current balance of
the market is disrupted, and one of the ISPs switches to a
non-neutral regime. We consider a content provider with a
subscription revenue model and a continuum of end-users.
The CP is also non-neutral, in the sense that she can charge
users of different ISPs different subscription fees, and use
this “leverage” to control the equilibrium outcome. Results
reveal that the CP is able to control the non-neutral ISP to
some extend. However, switching to a non-neutral regime
by an ISP tips the balance of the market in favor of this
ISP.
1. INTRODUCTION
Net neutrality on the Internet is perceived as the policy
that mandates Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to treat
all data equally, regardless of the source, destination, and
type of the data [1]. Recently, the net-neutrality debate has
received more attention, since in January 2014, a federal ap-
peals court struck down parts of the Federal Communication
Commission’s rules for Net-Neutrality [2]. Subsequently,
Comcast and Netflix signed an agreement in February 2014
in which Netflix should pay Comcast for a faster access to
Comcast’s subscribers [3].
However, changing the balance of the Internet market by
ISPs and switching to a non-neutral regime may eventu-
ally lead to a battle between ISPs and Content Providers
(CPs). Depending on their power over the market, the win-
ner can be any of the two. For instance, one can think
about scenarios that ISPs end up paying a popular CP to
have the privilege of carrying its data. The goal of this pa-
per is to model the interaction between ISPs and CPs in a
non-neutral regime.
Most of the literature about the Net Neutrality debate
fall into the realm of law and policy making. A survey of
the existing scarce literature on economics analysis of the
net-neutrality debate is presented in [4]. In this genre of
work, the social welfare analysis of the neutral and non-
neutral regime has been taken into account largely, while the
results and conclusions vary to a great extend depending on
the model used. In some cases, non-neutrality increases the
social welfare because of the increase in the investments by
ISPs. On the other hand, some results imply a lower social
Copyright is held by author/owner(s).
welfare in a non-neutral regime than a neutral one.
In this paper, we try to get an insight into the equilibrium
of the Internet market, when one of the ISPs switches to non-
neutrality. Elements of the market are two ISPs, a CP with
a subscription revenue model, and a continuum of end-users.
In our model, the CP should pay a per-subscriber fee to the
non-neutral ISP in order to access the ISP’s subscribers. In
addition, the CP can potentially charge users of different
ISPs with different subscription fees. This is what we call
the “leverage” of the CP over end-users and subsequently
ISPs, by which the CP can control the equilibrium of the
market.
We use the standard two-sided market framework intro-
duced in [5], and used in the context of the Internet market
in [6] (Section 2). We seek the sub-game perfect equilibrium
of the sequential game using backward induction (Section 3).
The results imply that in spite of the leverage of the CP over
ISPs and end-users, switching to non-neutrality will tip the
balance of the network in favor of the non-neutral ISP. More
discussions on the equilibrium of the market and its impli-
cations are presented in Section 4.
2. MARKET MODEL
We cast the problem with a two-sided market framework
which captures the Internet market appropriately. In addi-
tion, the problem is modelled as a sequential game. Two
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are considered that act as
platforms that connect the two sides of the Internet mar-
ket: a Content Provider (CP) that charges end-users with a
subscription fee and a continuum of end-users.
The ISPs
ISPs provide connection between CPs and end-users. We
assume that one of the ISPs is neutral (ISP N) and the other
is non-neutral (ISP NN). ISP N and NN provide Internet
connection with the same quality to end-users in exchange
of a subscription fee, pN , pNN ∈ R, respectively. Once the
subscription fee is paid by an end-user to the neutral ISP,
ISP N provides the connection between the end-user and the
CP. However, ISP NN offers the CP a take-it-or-leave-it per-
subscriber fee, p˜. This means that if the CP takes the offer,
she should pay a fixed fee p˜ ∈ R per each subscriber she gets
from those end-users that are connected to ISP NN. If not,
ISP NN will block the access of the CP to her end-users.
The CP
We assume that there exists only one CP, and denote this CP
by G. However, the results of this paper can be generalized
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Symbol Description
pN Internet connection fee charged by ISP N
p˜ per-subscriber fee that G pays to ISP NN
qN subscription fee that G charges ISP N’s users
piN payoff of ISP N
nCN fraction of users that buy Internet from ISP N
n′CN fraction of users that buy Internet from ISP N and pay for the content of G
uj,I(x) payoff from accessing to Internet for a user located at x connecting to ISP j
uj,G(x) payoff from content of G for a user located at x connecting to ISP j
uj(x) total payoff of a user located at x connecting to ISP j
piG payoff of the CP G
pNN , qNN , piNN , nCNN , n
′
CNN
corresponding parameters for ISP NN
∆q qNN − qN
peN , p
e
NN , p˜
e, qeN , q
e
NN , n
e
CN
, neCNN
, ∆qe corresponding parameters at the equilibrium
Table 1: Important Symbols
to a continuum of independent monopolist CPs that do not
compete with each other.
In our model, CP G makes profit by a subscription-based
model and can multi-home, i.e. can offer her content via
both ISPs . In addition, G is considered to be non-neutral,
in the sense that she can charge users of different ISPs differ-
ently. This strategic behavior of the CP can be interpreted
as a leverage by which CP G can potentially decrease the
incentive of an ISP for switching to a non-neutral regime.
We denote the subscription fees that G charges users of non-
neutral and neutral ISP by qN , qNN ∈ R, respectively.
The End-Users
We assume a continuum of single-homing customers, i.e.
they can connect to the Internet via only one ISP. We model
the valuation of customers for ISPs and CP G using a hotelling
model. In our hotelling model, we assume that the neutral
ISP is located at 0, the non-neutral one is located at 1, and
end-users are distributed uniformly along the unit interval,
[0, 1].
Let v denote the common valuation of end-users for the
Internet connection. The overall valuation of an end-user
located at x ∈ [0, 1] for connecting to the Internet via the
neutral and non-neutral ISP is v − tx and v − t(1 − x),
respectively, where tx and t(1 − x) are the transport costs
and t is the marginal transport cost. In words, the closer an
end-user to an ISP, the more the end-user prefers this ISP
to the other1.
One possible interpretation for the usage of the transport
cost is to capture the inertia of end-users to change their
current ISP due to their high budget and their prior experi-
ence with the ISP. In other words, wealthier users with high
budget are less sensitive to the price they pay, more reluc-
tant to change their ISP, and subsequently located near one
of the ISPs depending on their prior experience with ISPs.
Thus these users have higher valuation for connecting to the
Internet via the closest ISP.
In addition, we assume that the valuation of a user for
content of G increases by her budget. In other words, the
less sensitive a user to the price, the higher the chance of
buying the content from G. Since we assumed that users
with higher budgets are located near one of the ISPs, the
closer an end-user to one of the ISPs, i.e. points 0 or 1 on
the unit interval, the higher the valuation of the user for
1Note that the distance between an ISP and an end-user
defined in this model is different from the physical distance.
Figure 1: Schematic view of our two sided market
CP G. Let v∗ denote the common valuation of end-users for
CP G. A possible expression for the overall valuation of an
end-user located at x ∈ [0, 1] for CP G is v∗−tmin{x, 1−x}.
Figure 1 illustrates a schematic view of the two sided mar-
ket we consider. A list of more important symbols, used
throughout the paper, is presented in Table 1.
Payoffs
The payoffs obtained by ISP NN and N are:
piNN = (pNN − c)nCNN + p˜n′CNN
piN = (pN − c)nCN
(1)
where c is the per connection cost; nCN , nCNN , and n
′
CNN
are defined in Table 1.
At the end-user side, the payoff of a user that is located
at distance y of ISP j ∈ {N,NN} consists of two parts: the
payoff from the Internet connection, and the payoff from
accessing to the content of G:
uj,I(y) = v − ty − pj (2)
uj,G(y) = v
∗ − tmin{y, 1− y} − qj (3)
Thus, the payoff of the end-user is,
uj(y) =
 uj,I(y) + uj,G(y) Pays for Internet and Guj,I(y) Pays for Internet and not G
0 Does not pay for Internet
(4)
At the CP side, the payoff of G is,
piG = (qNN − p˜)n′CNN + qNn′CN (5)
Assumptions about the Market
We assume the full market coverage by ISPs. In other words,
pN and pNN are chosen by ISPs to ensure that all end-users
are willing to pay for the Internet connection to at least one
ISP. More formally, at the equilibrium, for x ∈ [0, 1],
uj(x) ≥ 0 for at least one j ∈ {N,NN} (6)
We argue in Section 4 that v ≥ 2t + c is a sufficient con-
dition for full market coverage at the equilibrium. Note
that the full coverage by ISPs is a natural and common as-
sumption. This assumption bundled with hotelling model is
necessary to create an element of competition between ISPs.
In addition, when solving the problem of CP in Section 3,
we assume that CP G chooses qN and qNN such that all end-
users are willing to pay the subscription fee after connecting
to the Internet. Thus, n′CNN = nCNN and n
′
CN
= nCN .
More formal condition for the market coverage by G is that
for x ∈ [0, 1],
uj,G(x) ≥ 0 for ISP j that user selects
The full market coverage by G arises because of the fact
that for CP G, not only the subscription fee, but also the
number of subscribers is important. This may happen be-
cause of connectivity considerations (e.g. social networks
with subscription revenue model that obviously care about
maximum connectivity), or financial considerations (aiming
to fetch some advertisement-based revenue). More discus-
sion about the implications of this assumption is deferred to
Section 4.
Timing
The timing of the sequential game is modeled as follows:
1. ISPs announce the per-subscriber fee for the CP G (p˜).
2. G sets the subscription fees (qN and qNN ).
3. ISPs set the connection fees (pN and pNN ).
4. End-users decide whether to participate and, if so,
which ISP to join.
We assume that the per-subscriber fee is set before the con-
nection fees by ISP NN in order to capture the longer time
horizon of contracts between ISPs and CPs. In addition, to
make the game between ISPs and the CP more balanced, it
is assumed that ISPs set the connection fees after G sets the
subscription fees.
3. THE SUB-GAME PERFECT EQUILIB-
RIUM
In this section, we seek the sub-game perfect equilibrium
of the sequential game using backward induction. Thus, we
start with the last stage:
Stage 4: End-users decide:
First note that the full market coverage by CP G yields that
pN , pNN , qN , and qNN are determined such that end-users
always pay for the connection and the content of G. Thus
in (4), uj(y) = uj,I(y) + uj,G(y). The customer located at
xn ∈ [0, 1] is indifferent between connecting to ISP 1 and 2:
v−t(1− xn)− pNN + v∗ − tmin{1− xn, xn} − qNN
= v − txn − pN + v∗ − tmin{xn, 1− xn} − qN
ISP N ISP NNxˆNN xˆNn
e
CN
neCNN
neCN
Figure 2: Conditions for full Market Coverage
⇒ xn = neCN =
1
2
+
pNN − pN + qNN − qN
2t
(7)
and the full market coverage implies that neCNN = 1−neCN .
Stage 3: ISPs set pN and pNN :
Utilizing the equilibrium outcome of the fourth stage (7),
payoffs obtained by the neutral and non-neutral ISPs are:
piNN = (pNN + p˜− c)(1
2
− pNN − pN + qNN − qN
2t
)
piN = (pN − c)(1
2
+
pNN − pN + qNN − qN
2t
)
(8)
Note that piNN and piN are concave functions of pNN and
pN , respectively. Applying the first order condition to pay-
offs ( dpiN
dpNN
= 0 and dpiN
dpN
= 0) yields the equilibrium strate-
gies, peNN and p
e
N :
peNN = t+ c− qNN − qN
3
− 2p˜
3
peN = t+ c+
qNN − qN
3
− p˜
3
(9)
Note that p˜ is known from stage 1 (to be explained later).
Thus, it is not explicitly dependent on pN and pNN . By
substitution in (7), the equilibrium outcome of the fourth
stage can be re-written as,
neCN =
1
2
+
qNN − qN − p˜
6t
neCNN =
1
2
− qNN − qN − p˜
6t
(10)
Stage 2: G sets qN and qNN :
We first state the conditions for the full coverage of the end-
user market by CP G. Let xˆN (respectively, xˆNN ) denote
the location of the customer with the largest distance from
N (resp., NN), which opts to buy the content from G if she
joins ISP N (resp., NN). Using the valuation of users for G,
for the full market coverage, qN and qNN should be chosen
such that:
• For the neutral ISP:
- If neCN ≥ 12 : From (3), v∗− t2 − qN ≥ 0⇒ qN ≤ v∗− t2 .
In this case, all the customers in the unit interval are willing
to buy the subscription plan.
- If neCN <
1
2
: xˆN ≥ neCN (Figure 2), where xˆN is such
that v∗ − txˆN − qN = 0. Thus, xˆN = v∗−qNt ≥ nCN .
• For the non-neutral ISP:
-If neCN <
1
2
: v∗ − t
2
− qNN ≥ 0⇒ qNN ≤ v∗ − t2 .
- If neCN ≥ 12 : xˆNN ≤ neCN (Figure 2), where xˆNN is such
that v∗− t(1− xˆNN )− qNN = 0. Thus, xˆNN = t+qNN−v∗t ≤
nCN .
Taking ∆q = qNN−qN yields that nCN ≥ 12 (resp., nCN <
1
2
) IFF ∆q ≥ p˜ (resp., ∆q < p˜). Thus, G determines qN and
qNN by solving the following optimization problem:
maxpiG = (qNN − p˜)(1
2
− ∆q − p˜
6t
) + qN (
1
2
+
∆q − p˜
6t
) (11)
s.t:
{
qN ≤ v∗ − t2 = uqN
qNN ≤ v∗ − t2 + ∆q−p˜6 = uqNN
if ∆q ≥ p˜ (12)
{
qN ≤ v∗ − t2 − ∆q−p˜6 = u′qN
qNN ≤ v∗ − t2 = u′qNN
if ∆q ≤ p˜ (13)
The solution is presented in the following theorem. The-
orem 1 is proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. The equilibrium strategy of the CP G de-
pends on p˜ and is as follows:
• If p˜ ≤ − 5t
4
, then ∆qe = p˜ + 3t
2
, qeN = uqN = v
∗ − t
2
,
and qeNN = q
e
N + ∆q
e.
• If − 5t
4
≤ p˜ ≤ 0, then ∆qe = − p˜
5
, qeN = uqN = v
∗ − t
2
,
and qeNN = q
e
N + ∆q
e.
• If 0 ≤ p˜ ≤ 5t
4
, then ∆qe = − p˜
5
, qeNN = u
′
qNN = v
∗− t
2
,
and qeN = q
e
NN −∆qe.
• If p˜ ≥ 5t
4
, then ∆qe = p˜− 3t
2
, qeNN = u
′
qNN = v
∗ − t
2
,
and qeN = q
e
NN −∆qe.
Stage 1: The Non-Neutral ISP sets p˜:
Using the equilibrium strategies obtained in stages 2 to 4,
the payoff of the non-neutral ISP depending on the range of
p˜ she chooses is:
pieNN =

t
8
if p˜ ≤ − 5t
4
(t+ 2
5
p˜)( 1
2
+ p˜
5
) If − 5t
4
≤ p˜ ≤ 5t
4
9t
8
If p˜ ≥ 5t
4
Therefore at the equilibrium, p˜e ≥ 5t
4
.
4. DISCUSSION
We first find a sufficient condition for the full market
coverage by ISPs. At the equilibrium, p˜e ≥ 5t
4
, peNN =
3t
2
+ c− p˜e, and peN = c+ t2 . Thus, the maximum price that
ISPs can charge users occurs when p˜e = 5t
4
, and is less than
t+ c. Thus, from (2) and (6), the assumption v > 2t+ c is
a sufficient condition for the full market coverage.
Note that qeN and q
e
NN are adjusted by G such that the
payoff of ISP NN for p˜ ≥ 5t
4
is independent of p˜. Thus,
the non-neutral ISP cannot strictly increase her payoff by
charging CP G a very high price. This is the result of the
leverage of the CP G over ISPs and end-users.
In addition, note that at the equilibrium, neCNN > n
e
CN
,
i.e. the non-neutral ISP attracts more customers, and peNN <
peN which implies that the non-neutral ISP subsidizes end-
users with the money that she collects from G. This in-
creases the differentiation between platforms, and makes the
non-neutral ISP more favorable for end-users.
Another interesting result is that ∆qe = p˜e − 3t
2
can be
positive or negative at the equilibrium, depending on p˜e. If
p˜e = 5t
4
, then ∆qe < 0. This means that CP G charges
the users of the non-neutral ISP with a price lower than
the users of the neutral one, which is counter-intuitive. To
see what derives this counter-intuitive result, first note that
from (10), nCNN =
1
2
− ∆q−p˜
6t
. Thus, if ISP NN be able to
decrease ∆q − p˜ by choosing p˜ high enough, she can obtain
more per-subscriber revenue from G and also increase the
number of her end-users. The later is because of the fact
that ISP NN subsidizes end-users from the money she gets
from G (peNN =
3t
2
+c−p˜). Thus, the higher p˜, the higher the
subsidies, and so the number of end-users that choose ISP
NN for Internet connection. This leads to the desire of ISP
NN to choose p˜ in the equilibrium such that neCNN >
1
2
, and
force the equilibrium solution of CP G to satisfy constraints
(13) rather than (12). In this case, G maximizes her payoff
by increasing the upper bound on qN
2, which she do so by
choosing ∆q − p˜ to be negative. This leads to a higher
upper bound for qN in comparison to qNN , which leads to
our counter-intuitive, yet important, result.
An alternative interpretation for this result is that given
that ISP NN attracts more than half of the end-users by ap-
propriately choosing p˜ and subsidizing the end-users there-
after, G knows that those who stay with the neutral ISP are
those users who are less sensitive to price and have a higher
budget. Therefore G compensates what she pays to ISP NN
by charging these users a higher price.
The results imply that in spite of the leverage of CP
G in determining her subscription fees, switching to non-
neutrality by an ISP will tip the balance of the Internet
market in favor of this ISP. In fact, the non-neutral ISP can
extract some profits from CP G as well as the neutral ISP.
The results of this model are dependent on the assumption
of the full market coverage by G, since this assumption may
reduce the strength of the leverage of G.
A direction for future works is to investigate the market
equilibrium when G is not restricted to cover the end-user
market. Another possible direction, is to consider invest-
ment decisions by ISPs.
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2Note that the upper bound for qNN is fixed in these con-
strains.
APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In order to prove the Theorem, we first narrow down the
candidate answers in Lemma 1 and 2.
Lemma 1. In an optimum solution of (11)-(13), at least
one of qN or qNN should be equal to its upper bound.
Proof. Suppose not. Thus, the optimum qN and qNN
are both strictly smaller than their upper bounds. Consider
a sufficiently small  > 0. Note that qN +  and qNN + 
are feasible solutions. Using (11), it can be concluded that
piG(qN + , qNN + ) > piG(qN , qNN ). This is a contradiction
with qN and qNN being optimum solutions.
Lemma 2. There are four sets of candidate answers to
(11)-(13), depending on p˜:
1. −5∆q ≤ p˜ ≤ ∆q and qNN = uqNN .
2. p˜ ≤ min{∆q,−5∆q} and qN = uqN .
3. p˜ ≥ max{∆q,−5∆q} and qNN = u′qNN .
4. ∆q ≤ p˜ ≤ −5∆q and qN = u′qN .
Proof. First note that if ∆q ≥ p˜, then uqNN ≥ uqN . If
qNN = uqNN , then the constraint for qN should be satisfied:
qN = uqNN −∆q ≤ uqN ⇒ ∆q ≥ uqNN − uqN
⇒ ∆q ≥ ∆q − p˜
6
⇒ p˜ ≥ −5∆q
Thus, ∆q ≥ p˜ ≥ −5∆q, which is the first candidate set.
On the other hand, if qN = uqN , then the constraint for
qNN should be satisfied:
qNN = uqN + ∆q ≤ uqNN ⇒ uqNN − uqN ≥ ∆q
⇒ p˜ ≤ −5∆q
Thus, p˜ ≤ min{∆q,−5∆q}.
In another case, if ∆q ≤ p˜, then u′qN ≥ u′qNN . If qNN =
u′qNN then,
qN = u
′
qNN −∆q ≤ u′qN ⇒ ∆q ≥ u′qNN − u′qN
⇒ p˜ ≥ −5∆q
Thus, p˜ ≥ max{∆q,−5∆q}.
On the other hand, if qN = u
′
qN then,
qNN = u
′
qN + ∆q ≤ u′qNN ⇒ u′qNN − u′qN ≥ ∆q
⇒ p˜ ≤ −5∆q
Thus, using ∆q ≤ p˜, ∆q ≤ p˜ ≤ −5∆q. The proof is com-
plete.
In order to find the best response, first consider the first
set of candidate answers. Thus, qNN = uqNN = v
∗ − t
2
+
∆q−p˜
6
, qN = qNN − ∆q, and subsequently equation (11) is
only a function of ∆q. Note that (11) is concave with respect
to ∆q, and,
dqNN
d∆q
=
1
6
dqN
d∆q
= −5
6
Solving dpiG
d∆q
= 0 yields that ∆q∗ = p˜ − t. Therefore,
∆q∗ < p˜, which does not satisfy the condition for the first
candidate set. Thus, the first set is eliminated.
The second candidate set is qN = uqN = v
∗ − t
2
, qNN =
qN +∆q, and p˜ ≤ min{∆q,−5∆q}. Note that piG is concave
with respect to ∆q, and,
dqN
d∆q
= 0
dqNN
d∆q
= 1
Solving dpiG
d∆q
= 0 yields ∆q∗ = p˜+ 3
2
t. Note that ∆q∗ > p˜.
Thus, ∆q∗ is the optimum solution if p˜ ≤ −5∆q∗. Thus,
∆q∗ ≤ − p˜
5
⇒ p˜ ≤ − 15t
12
= − 5t
4
is the condition for optimal-
ity of this candidate set.
With similar computations, the third candidate set yields
the optimum solution of ∆q∗ = p˜ − 3
2
t. The optimality
condition of this set is ∆q∗ ≥ − p˜
5
⇒ p˜ ≥ 5t
4
.
For the fourth set of candidate answers the optimum an-
swer is ∆q∗ = p˜ + t. However, ∆q∗ > p˜, which does not
satisfy the condition for this set. Thus, the forth set is elim-
inated.
Now, we prove Theorem 1:
Proof. We argued that in the first and the fourth sets of
candidate answers the optimal solutions derived by the first
order condition are not feasible. Therefore, since the payoff
is concave, in these two sets, the candidate answers are on
the boundaries.
We first consider the second and third sets of feasible an-
swers. Note that in the second set of feasible answer p˜ ≤ 0,
since p˜ ≤ min{∆q,−5∆q}, and in the third set, p˜ ≥ 0, since
p˜ ≥ max{∆q,−5∆q}.
Thus if p˜ ≤ 0, the second candidate set should be con-
sidered. The condition p˜ ≤ min{∆q,−5∆q} is equivalent
to p˜ ≤ ∆q ≤ − p˜
5
. We argued that in the second set, if
p˜ ≤ − 5t
4
, then ∆q∗ = p˜+ 3t
2
. If not, then the optimum solu-
tion should be either ∆q∗ = p˜ or ∆q∗ = − p˜
5
. By comparing
the payoffs, we prove that in the second candidate set, when
− 5t
4
≤ p˜ ≤ 0, ∆q∗ = − p˜
5
.
If ∆q = p˜, in the second set:
qN = uqN = v
∗ − t
2
qNN = qN + ∆q = v
∗ − t
2
+ p˜
piG|∆q=p˜ = v∗ − t
2
and if ∆q = − p˜
5
,
qN = uqN = v
∗ − t
2
qNN = qN + ∆q = v
∗ − t
2
− p˜
5
piG|∆q=− p˜
5
= (v∗ − t
2
− 6p˜
5
)(
1
2
+
p˜
5t
) + (v∗ − t
2
)(
1
2
− p˜
5t
)
= v∗ − t
2
− 6p˜
5
(
1
2
+
p˜
5t
)
Since − 5t
4
≤ p˜ ≤ 0, 1
2
+ p˜
5t
> 0, and piG|∆q=− p˜
5
> piG|∆q=p˜.
Thus, in the second candidate set, when − 5t
4
≤ p˜ ≤ 0,
∆q∗ = − p˜
5
.
On the other hand, if p˜ ≥ 0, the third candidate set should
be considered. The condition p˜ ≥ max{∆q,−5∆q} is equiv-
alent to − p˜
5
≤ ∆q ≤ p˜. We argued that in the third set,
if p˜ ≥ 5t
4
, then ∆q∗ = p˜ − 3t
2
. If not, then the optimum
solution should be either ∆q∗ = p˜ or ∆q∗ = − p˜
5
. Again, by
comparing the payoffs, we prove that in the third candidate
set, when 0 ≤ p˜ ≤ 5t
4
, ∆q∗ = − p˜
5
.
If ∆q = p˜, in the third set:
qNN = u
′
qNN = v
∗ − t
2
qN = qNN −∆q = v∗ − t
2
− p˜
piG|∆q=p˜ = v∗ − t
2
− p˜
and if ∆q = − p˜
5
,
qNN = u
′
qNN = v
∗ − t
2
qN = qNN −∆q = v∗ − t
2
+
p˜
5
piG|∆q=− p˜
5
= (v∗ − t
2
− p˜)(1
2
+
p˜
5t
) + (v∗ − t
2
+
p˜
5
)(
1
2
− p˜
5t
)
= v∗ − t
2
+
p˜
5
− 6p˜
5
(
1
2
+
p˜
5t
)
Since 0 ≤ p˜ ≤ 5t
4
, 1
2
+ p˜
5t
< 1, and piG|∆q=− p˜
5
> piG|∆q=p˜.
Thus, in the third candidate set, when − 5t
4
≤ p˜ ≤ 0, ∆q∗ =
− p˜
5
.
Now, consider the first set. The condition −5∆q ≤ p˜ ≤
∆q is equivalent to ∆q ≥ max{p˜,− p˜
5
}. Since the solution
to the first order condition is not feasible, ∆q∗ = p˜ if p˜ ≥ 0,
and ∆q∗ = − p˜
5
if p˜ ≤ 0. If p˜ ≥ 0, qNN = v∗− t2 , and if p˜ ≤ 0,
qNN = v
∗ − t
2
− p˜
5
and qN = v
∗ − t
2
. Both are two feasible
points in the third and second candidate sets, respectively.
Thus none of them can be an optimum solution.
The condition for the fourth case is ∆q ≤ p˜ ≤ −5∆q,
which is equivalent to ∆q ≤ min{p˜,− p˜
5
}. Since the solution
to the first order condition is not feasible, ∆q∗ = p˜ if p˜ ≤ 0,
and ∆q∗ = − p˜
5
if p˜ ≥ 0. If p˜ ≤ 0, qN = v∗ − t2 , and if
p˜ ≥ 0, qN = v∗ − t2 + p˜5 and qNN = v∗ − t2 . Both are two
feasible points in the candidate second and third candidate
sets, respectively. Thus none of them can be an optimum
solution. The result follows.
